















Comparing school ownership performance using a pseudo-panel database:  
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In this paper, we propose a different way of using the Malmquist index that allows us to further 
analyze the relative performance divergences between two groups of decision-making units 
(DMUs) over time when only a pseudo-panel database is available. To do this, we extend the 
Camanho and Dyson (2006) one-period Malmquist-type index (CDMI) for a pseudo-panel 
database with a new pseudo-panel Malmquist index (PPMI). To illustrate the methodology, we 
apply it to examine how the performance gap between public and private government-dependent 
secondary schools in the Basque Country (Spain) performed across three PISA waves (2006, 
2009 and 2012). The results suggest that performance is persistently and significantly higher for 
private government-dependent schools than for public schools. 
 






















Traditionally, the Malmquist index, proposed by Caves et al. (1982), is used to measure 
productivity changes between two or more periods. This implies that the same group of 
decision-making units (DMUs) is observed across all analyzed periods. In the educational or 
health sectors, however, it is common to extract random waves of representative samples of 
DMUs in order to analyze their resources, activities, results and performance
1
. The DMUs 
contained in each wave vary from one year to another and are mostly anonymous for 
researchers. So, we will refer to this information as a pseudo-panel database.  
 
In many sectors related to services supply, it is likewise worth analyzing alternative approaches 
to carry out the production process. The groups of DMUs that employ one or other production 
scheme perform basically the same tasks using the same set of inputs to be transformed into the 
same set of outputs, but the internal organizational and managerial techniques used to deliver 
the service may differ. Camanho and Dyson (2006) originally proposed a Malmquist-type index 
(CDMI from now on) in order to achieve an average indicator of the relative performance of 
two or more groups of DMUs within a period. The CDMI has been used in the literature (Vaz 
and Camanho, 2012; Ferreira and Marques, 2014; Thanassoulis et al. 2015) to provide 
straightforward performance comparisons of groups of DMUs in one period. However, it would 
also be interesting to follow up how the measured performance gap changes over time. This is 
the aim of this paper. 
 
Regarding the education sector, a lot of the literature focuses on comparing performance by 
school ownership. For example, education is publicly funded in many countries, but education 
may be delivered by public schools (PS) or private government-dependent schools (PGDS). 
Previous research justifies the existence of PGDS arguing that privately run schools are likely to 
perform better than public schools because market competition should force private schools to 
achieve a more efficient use of resources while at the same time providing high standards of 
quality for their students (Alchian 1950; Friedman and Friedman 1981; Chubb and Moe 1990; 
Hoxby 2003). Nevertheless, much of the research (Kirjavainen and Loikkanen 1998; 
Vandenberghe and Robin 2004; Perelman and Santín, 2011; Mancebón et al. 2012; Crespo-
Cebada et al. 2014 among many others) provides mixed evidence about the superiority of either 
school type. Following Mancebón and Muñiz (2008) we think that the inconclusive results in 
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PISA, TIMSS and PIRLS are some international education databases that belong to this category. They 
will be described below. Some examples in the health sector would be NTDB (the National Trauma Data 














the literature review can be due to country-specific heterogeneity in factors as the level of 
competition among schools or the admission policy among other factors. For this reason, 
analyzing the relative performance gap between both school groups is an important and not 
straightforward question to be answered empirically using the available educational data.  
 
Note that many studies have used cross-sectional data in order to tackle the inefficiency 
measurement issue in education at school level with non-parametric techniques (De Witte and 
López-Torres, 2015). However, only a few have applied the standard Malmquist index to 
examine productivity changes in schools (some exceptions are Maragos and Despotis (2004), 
Portela et al. (2013), Essid et al. (2014) and Brennan et al. (2014)). A possible explanation for 
the failure of empirical studies to apply the Malmquist index for benchmarking schools is the 
difficulty of obtaining administrative panel databases at school level from educational 
authorities. 
 
The recent increase in national and international programs to evaluate educational achievement 
over the last few decades is indicative of a greater policy concern about educational 
performance (Hanushek and Kimko, 2000; Hanushek and Woessman, 2008; De la Fuente, 
2011). Hence, there has been strong backing for international projects evaluating educational 
achievement for the vehicular disciplines: mathematics, reading and science. The most 
important international programs are TIMSS (Third International Mathematics and Science 
Study), PISA (Programme for International Student Assessment) and PIRLS (Progress in 
International Reading Literacy Study), although many countries perform their own national 
evaluations. The main advantage of these international programs is that they provide an external 
evaluation of educational outcomes in an attempt to identify the causes of academic 
achievement levels and allow policy makers and school principals to thoroughly explore their 
management strengths and weaknesses. Nevertheless, it is not straightforward to compare 
school performance over time using these repeated cross sectional international studies because 
participant schools and students differ from one wave to another.  
 
This paper proposes a new approach for comparing the performance of representative groups of 
DMUs using the Malmquist index when only a pseudo-panel database is available. This method 
extends Camanho and Dyson‘s Malmquist-type index for measuring and comparing the 
productivity of two groups of DMUs in one period
2
. With the aim of showing our proposal‘s 
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 A similar strategy was developed previously by Berg et al. (1993) in order to compare banking 
efficiencies in three Nordic countries or Balk and Althin (1996) to compare the evolution of Swedish 
pharmacy productivity over the 1980-89 period. Both papers propose new strategies for calculating the 














potential, we include an empirical application in the educational context in order to test possible 
relative performance disparities between public (PS) and private government dependent schools 
(PGDS) over three time periods (from 2006 to 2012) on the publicly funded educational system 
in the Basque Country. This autonomous region of Spain participated in the Programme for 
International Student Assessment (PISA) administered in 2006, 2009 and 2012 by the 





The Malmquist index was proposed by Caves, Christensen and Diewert (1982) with the aim of 
measuring the total factor productivity changes between two data points within two time periods 
as the ratio of the distances of each data point relative to a common frontier. The index may be 
built and decomposed using different data envelopment analysis (DEA) programs to compute 
different distances between the evaluated production unit and the frontier for each period. 
According to Färe et al. (1994), the output-oriented Malmquist productivity index for two 
periods of time t and t+1 under a constant returns to scale technology
3
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where the superscript indicates the time period,  1,...,
K
Kx x x R 
 and  1,...,
S
Sy y y R 
 are 
vectors of inputs and outputs, respectively, and     , inf : ,q h h h h qD x y x y Tθ θ   is the 
Shephard output distance function from the period h observation  ,h hx y  to the frontier of the 
period q technology   , : can produce q q q K S q qT x y R x y  . 
 
Färe et al. (1994) also showed that this index may be decomposed into efficiency change and 
technical change as follows. 
                                                                                                                                               
baseline in order to calculate multi-period Malmquist indices, respectively. Both alternatives satisfy the 
transitivity property. 
3
There are other studies, such as Balk and Althin (1996), Ray and Desli, (1997), Grifell-Tatjé and Lovell 
(1999), Forsund (2002) and Brennan et al (2014), that also consider variable returns to scale. However, it 
is well known (Pastor and Lovell, 2005, Afsharian and Ahn, 2014) that infeasibilities can arise when 
DEA is used to compute the distance functions constituting the Malmquist decomposition when the scale 
component is taken into account in the productivity growth. For the sake of simplicity, we follow 
Camanho and Dyson (2006) in this paper and assume a constant returns to scale technology avoiding the 
infeasibility issue (Xue and Harker, 2002). In the case of our empirical application to education, scale is 
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A Malmquist index higher (lower) than one implies productivity improvements (losses) from 
period t to period t+1. Furthermore, Equation (2) includes two components. The first ratio 
shows the technical efficiency change (EC), which captures the efficiency improvements 
(reductions) in period t+1 with respect to period t if EC > 1 (EC < 1), whereas EC = 1 indicates 
that there are no changes in technical efficiency. The second measure (in square brackets) 
represents the technological change (TC) in period t+1 with respect to period t, whose value 
may be analyzed in a similar way to EC (TC>1 now means technological progress), although 
the two measures may point in different directions.  
 
2. 1. Camanho-Dyson Malmquist Index (CDMI) approach 
 
In the Malmquist index methodology the same group of DMUs has to be observed in different 
periods, for which purpose a panel database needs to be implemented. However, this approach 
was not originally defined to explore the potential performance disparities among different 
groups of units whose organizational structure and background circumstances differ over time. 
To overcome part of this problem, Camanho and Dyson (2006) originally proposed a 
Malmquist-type index in order to achieve an average indicator of the relative performance of 
two or more groups of DMUs within the same period when the organizational and managerial 
guidelines differ as applies in the school ownership case.  
 
The CDMI is an adaptation of the Malmquist index to provide a cross-sectional comparison of 
the performance of DMUs operating under different conditions rather than a measurement of the 
productivity change between two periods. Camanho and Dyson (2006) defined an overall 
measure for comparing the performance between two (or more) groups of DMUs by replacing 
the superindices t and t+1 related to the period by G (which we assume to denote PGDS) and P 
(which we assume in the empirical exercise to be PS) related to the groups to be compared. 
Consider N DMUs (j = 1,…,N) in group G, using an input vector 
G Kx R  to produce outputs 




j yx , and 
( , )q G Gj jD x y  represents the Shephard output distance function for DMU j with respect to the 















P Kx R  to produce outputs 
P Sy R , where the input-output vector for DMUi in 




i yx , and ( , )
q P P
i iD x y  represents the Shephard output distance 
function for DMU i with respect to the frontier of group q (q=G, P). The CDMI for comparing 
the performance of two groups of DMUs G and P associated with different programs, 
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The ratios inside square brackets evaluate the distance of the DMUs to a single reference 
technology. The first ratio assesses the geometric average distance of units belonging to group 
G divided by the geometric average distance of DMUs from group P, all measured relative to 
group G‘s frontier. The second ratio is a similar quotient but using group P‘s frontier as 
benchmark. Following Camanho and Dyson (2006), 
GP
tCDMI  may be interpreted as an overall 
measure for the comparison of the relative performance between the units of the two groups, G 
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tEG  outside square brackets in (4) compares within-group efficiency spreads, 
measuring the technical efficiency gap between both groups, while the ratio 
GP
tTG , inside 
square brackets, evaluates the productivity gap between the frontiers of the two analyzed 
groups, measuring the distance between the best-practice frontiers of G and P. In terms of the 
interpretation of 
GP
tCDMI , and both components, a value greater than one indicates better 
performance in group G than in group P. The decomposition in (4) illustrates that better overall 
performance may be related to two possible factors: less dispersion in the technical efficiency 
















Figure 1 illustrates these concepts in a simple one input-one output setting in order to compare 
two groups of DMUs in one period. Let us assume that the G Frontier and P Frontier represent 
the constant returns to scale technologies for both PGDS and PS, respectively. 
 































The circles in Figure 1 represent the N DMUs in group G, whereas crosses represent the M 
DMUs in group P. This production activity information is used to estimate both production 
frontiers using DEA. Consequently, we estimate the distance of each school to its own frontier. 
Then, we estimate the geometric average distance of each group with respect to its own frontier 
and the comparison group frontier. The dots G and P in Figure 1 denote this theoretical average 
production activity for both groups, considering the performance of DMUs belonging to the 
same group only. Therefore, according to Equation (3), we calculate the four required distance 
functions, measured as the geometric average distance of units belonging to each of both groups 
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The CDMI approach is capable of evaluating the average discrepancies between both school 
groups
4
, but it was not defined for analyzing this behavior over time. One advantage of this 
approach over Charnes et al.‘s (1981) well-known methodology is that the CDMI does not need 
to pool the DMUs together to build a common meta-frontier
5
. In summary, note that the CDMI 
is essentially a standard Malmquist index where the two time periods are replaced by group 
superindices and where only the average result is meaningful.  
 
2.2. CDMI extended: the Pseudo-Panel Malmquist index 
 
The CDMI provides an opportunity to monitor a sector in which panel databases do not exist, 
for example, an educational system. As mentioned before, the number of national and 
international pseudo-panel databases for schools available for research has grown in recent 
years. A pseudo-panel database consists of different waves of representative school samples, 
where participant schools and students vary from one wave to another.  
 
With the aim of analyzing the evolution of the school ownership divergences
6
 across two time 
periods, we propose making the ratio of two CDMIs calculated for two time periods t and t+1. 
Applying this strategy we can check which organizational pattern behaves better over time in 
order to infer relevant implications for policy makers. The relative performance gap change 
between PGDS and PS within t and t+1 is defined as the pseudo-panel Malmquist index (PPMI) 











            (9) 
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 Camanho and Dyson (2006) show that their index can also be used to compare more than two groups in 
a more general setting. The CDMI for more than two groups satisfies Frisch‘s circularity condition 








 The CDMI does not assume convex combinations of group-specific frontiers to be feasible.   
6
 The empirical application of this paper compares two types of school ownership. However, this 
methodology could be applied to any other comparison of two or more groups of DMUs whose practices 
differ significantly. This methodology can also be used in impact evaluation programs to compare results 















Equation (9) measures how CDMI changes over time. In order to interpret PPMI in a suitable 
way, it is necessary to analyze both values of its components, 
GP
tCDMI  and 
GP
1tCDMI  , and the 






1t  . This means that, on average, group P had a better relative 
performance than group G both in t and t+1 periods. Additionally and regarding the value of 
PPMI, there are two possibilities. 
 
(1a) , 1 1
GP
t tPPMI   , which means that the relative performance gap was opened up by P over G. 
In fact,  , 1100 1 GPt tPPMI    indicates the percentage in which the relative performance of G 
compared to P has worsened. 
 
(1b) , 1 1
GP
t tPPMI   , which means that the group G is catching up on the group P. In this case, 
 , 1100 1GPt tPPMI    indicates the percentage in which the relative performance of G compared 






1t  . This means that group G had a better relative performance 
than group P both in t and t+1. Moreover, regarding PPMI, we have again two scenarios. 
 
(2a) , 1 1
GP
t tPPMI   , which means that the group P is catching up on the group G. In fact, 
 , 1100 1 GPt tPPMI    indicates the percentage in which the relative performance of G compared 
to P has decreased.  
 
(2b) , 1 1
GP
t tPPMI   , which means that the relative performance gap was opened up by G over P. 
In this case,  , 1100 1GPt tPPMI    indicates the percentage in which the relative performance of 




t   and 1CDMI
GP
1t  . Under this scenario, group G had a better relative 














second period, t+1. As for the value of PPMI, we have only one possibility: , 1 1
GP
t tPPMI   . In 
this case, the status of group G worsened drastically from period t to period t+1, and the value 
of the PPMI measures how many the relative performance gap between the two analyzed groups 
of units reduced over time through  , 1100 1 GPt tPPMI   %.  
 
Setting 4: 1CDMIGPt   and 1CDMI
GP
1t  . In this case, P had a better relative performance 
than G in period t but the relation between both groups changed drastically in period t+1, where 
G had a better relative performance than P. Regarding the PPMI, we have again only one 
possibility: , 1 1
GP
t tPPMI   . In this case, the status of group G improved from period t to period 
t+1, and the value of the PPMI signals how many the relative performance gap between the two 
analyzed groups of units increased over time through  , 1100 1GPt tPPMI   %.  
 
Note that above, seeking simplicity, we did not consider scenarios where a sign of equality is 
possible. However, its interpretation is straightforward. For the CDMI index, it would mean that 
no group stands out over the other and for the PPMI measure, and regarding the relative 
performance gap, it would imply that no changes over time occurred.  
 
As was suggested by Camanho and Dyson (2006), the results of the comparison of the relative 
performance of group G and P through the CDMI index should not be interpreted isolated but 
alongside the disaggregated measures corresponding to the technical efficiency spread 
dimension and the frontier productivity dimension. Accordingly, the PPMI can also be 
decomposed into efficiency gap change (EGC) and technological gap change (TGC), as 
Equation 10 shows: 
 
1 1 1
, 1 , 1 , 1.
GP GP GP
GP GP GPt t t






        (10) 
 
 
For the correct interpretation of the values of the two sub-components, , 1
GP
t tEGC   and , 1
GP
t tTGC  , 
we need to follow the same casuistry than that introduced above for the PPMI measure. For the 















Additionally, it is worth mentioning that the PPMI for two groups satisfies the circular 
relationship, so 
GP
ttPPMI 2,   =
GP
ttPPMI 1,  
GP
ttPPMI 2,1  . This property is demonstrated by 























           (11) 
 
The CDMI, despite being a Malmquist-type index, does not measure productivity change but 
relative performance between two groups, or more, of decision making units. As a consequence, 
the PPMI does not has a direct relationship with the productivity change over time of units in 
groups G and P. Nevertheless, next we will identify when the PPMI is related to the ratio 
between an aggregated measure of productivity changes, from t to t+1, of the units 
corresponding to group G and an aggregated measure of productivity changes, from t to t+1, of 
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where the superscripts t and t+1 denotes that the technology of reference and/or the 
corresponding vector of inputs and outputs was observed in t and t+1, respectively. 
 
Note that both the numerator and the denominator in (12) are consistent with the expression of 
the Malmquist productivity index developed by Färe et al. (1994) as reported in (1), but adapted 
following the philosophy of Camanho and Dyson (2006) for aggregating distances. In this 
sense, the numerator could be interpreted as a relative measure of performance change from t to 
t+1 experienced by the units belonging to group G. The denominator has the same interpretation 
than the numerator changing G by P. Additionally, we want to highlight that in the case of 
working with an usual panel data, where the same set of DMUs has been observed across all 
analyzed periods and, therefore, 1t tN N N   and 
1t tM M M  , expression (12) would be 























( , , , )
,
( , , , )
t t t t
t t t t
N
N
G G G G




P P P P
i i i i
i
M x y x y
PPMI














       (13) 
 
In general, PPMI does not coincide with expression (12). We next show under which conditions 
both expressions are equivalent. 
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In this way, the result of the proposition is true if and only if the second ratio equals one.  
 
In the proposition, we introduced a new term, denoted as , 1
GP
t tDC  , and baptized as the 
‗Divergence Component‘ of the PPMI. It indicates how far is the PPMI from the expression that 
appears in (12) with a meaning of ratio of aggregated productivity changes in G and P. Note that 
mixed group distances appear in the formulation of , 1
GP
t tDC   as, for example, 
1 1 1
( , )
t t tP G G
j jD x y
  
, 
which resorts to the frontier of the technology associated with the group P in period t+1 for 
calculating the distance from a unit of the group G observed in the same period of time.  
 
Regarding the sub-components of the PPMI, the case of the efficiency gap change is the easiest 
to be studied since , 1
GP
t tEGC   always coincides with the ratio between an aggregated measure of 
technical efficiency changes, from t to t+1, of the units in G and an aggregated measure of 
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Something similar to the PPMI happens with the technological gap change component, 
, 1
GP
t tTGC  , when the aim is to relate this last measure to the technological change term, TC, of 
the traditional Malmquist productivity index in (2) for G and P. , 1
GP














general, with the ratio of aggregated measures of technological changes for the units in the 
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By analogy with the TC component in (2), the first ratio in (15) is, in some sense, a quotient that 
compares an aggregated measure of technological changes, from t to t+1, of the units in G to an 
aggregated measure of technological changes, from t to t+1, of the units in P, while the second 
ratio coincides, as expected, with the divergence component of Proposition 1. Therefore, we 
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As happens with the PPMI, if we work with a standard panel data instead of a pseudo-panel 
database, the efficiency gap change coincides with the ratio of the geometric mean of the 
traditional efficiency changes calculated using exclusively group G in t and t+1 and the 
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. As for the technological gap change and 
under the satisfaction of Proposition 2, this term coincides with the ratio of the geometric mean 
of the traditional technological changes calculated using exclusively group G in t and t+1 and 
the geometric mean of the traditional technological changes calculated using exclusively group 
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Next, we illustrate the introduced methodology through three simple numerical examples, 
before showing how this performs in a real situation. 
 
Example 1. Let us assume that we have observed three different units in two periods: A, B and 
C. Units A and B belong to the group G, whereas unit C belongs to the group P. Let us also 
suppose that the technology produces a single output with a single input. The data are as 
follows: A(t)=(10,10), B(t)=(10,1), C(t)=(10,5), A(t+1)=(10,15), B(t+1)=(10,1) and 
C(t+1)=(10,5). The example is illustrated by Figure 2. Applying the definitions of the CDMI, 
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     and 
, 1 , 1
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GP GP






    . This means that 
group P (unit C) had a better performance than group G (units A and B) both in t and t+1 
periods (setting 1) and it was due exclusively to the dimension associated with the technical 
efficiency spread ( 1GPtEG   and 1 1
GP
tEG   ). However, the group G is catching up on the 
group P since , 1 1.225 1
GP
t tPPMI     (setting 1(b)). In particular, the relative performance of G 
compared to P improved by 22.5% from t to t+1, despite going behind the group P in both 
periods. Finally, and regarding Proposition 1, , 1 1.107 1.
GP
t tDC    Therefore, (12) does not hold 
in this example and the PPMI cannot be interpreted as the ratio of aggregated productivity 


















Figure 2: Graphical illustration of example 1 
 
 
Example 2. Let us assume now that we have observed again three different units in two periods: 
A, B and C. Units A and B belong to the group G, whereas unit C belongs to the group P. Let us 
also suppose that the technology produces a single output with a single input. In this case, the 
data are as follows: A(t)=(10,10), B(t)=(10,1), C(t)=(10,5), A(t+1)=(10,10), B(t+1)=(10,1) and 
C(t+1)=(10,10). This example is illustrated by Figure 3. Applying the definitions of the CDMI, 
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, 1 0.5 1 0.5
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    . This means that 
group P (unit C) had a better performance than group G (units A and B) both in t and t+1 
periods (setting 1) and, as in the first example, the dimension associated with the technical 
efficiency spread was to blame ( 1GPtEG   and 1 1
GP
tEG   ). Additionally, the relative 
performance gap was opened up by P over G ( , 1 0.5 1
GP
t tPPMI    ). In fact, PPMI indicates the 
percentage in which the relative performance of G compared to P has worsened (setting 1(a)). 
Specifically, the relative performance of G compared to P worsened significantly by 50% from t 
to t+1. Taking into account Proposition 1, , 1 1.
GP
t tDC    Therefore, (12) holds. Moreover, (13) 
also holds since we are working with a panel data in this numerical example. If the traditional 
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coincides with the value calculated for the , 1
GP
t tPPMI   in this example. 
 
Figure 3: Graphical illustration of example 2 
 
 
In the first two examples, we resorted to standard panel databases. In the next simple numerical 
example, we will use a pseudo-panel database. Analyzing the results obtained in the Example 2, 
group B has a worse relative performance than group P both in periods t and t+1, and the reason 
is its behavior in the technical efficiency spread with respect to group P ( 1GPtEG   and 
1 1
GP
tEG   ). In particular, unit B was the culprit, since it was very inefficient regarding the 
frontier in G. In this way, we will delete unit B from period t of the database for generating a 
new example (Example 3), improving the technical efficiency spread for group G in the first 
period. 
 
Example 3. Let us assume that we have observed two units in period t (A and C) and three units 
in period t+1 (A, B and C). Units A and B belong to the group G, whereas unit C belongs to the 














The data are: A(t)=(10,10), C(t)=(10,5), A(t+1)=(10,10), B(t+1)=(10,1) and C(t+1)=(10,10). In 






CDMI    , 
11








     and 
, 1 , 1
, 1 0.158 0.316 0.5
GP GP






    . Consequently, this situation is related to setting 3. 
Therefore, group G had a better relative performance than group P in period t but P had a better 
behavior than G in the second period, t+1. Moreover, the status of group G worsened drastically 
over time since , 1 0.158 1
GP
t tPPMI    . Specifically, the relative performance gap is reduced by 
84.2% (0.842=1-0.158). Going into detail, , 1 0.316 1
GP
t tEGC     and comes from the ratio of 
1GPtEC   and 1 0.316 1
GP
tEC    . So, setting 1(a) applies for this sub-component. Groups G 
and P had the same behavior, regarding efficiency spread, in the first period. However, P had a 
better performance than group G in t+1. Moreover, the efficiency gap was opened up by P over 
G (the efficiency spread of G compared to P has worsened by 68.4%). Regarding the frontier 
productivity gap, we have that 2GPtTG   and 1 1
GP
tTG    with , 1 0.5
GP
t tTGC    (setting 2(a)). 
Therefore, the group G had a frontier with greater productivity than the group P in t and there 
were no differences between the two groups in period t+1. Additionally, we observe that the 
group P is catching up on the group G with respect to the technological dimension. The frontier 
productivity gap decreased by 50% from t to t+1. Finally, regarding Proposition 1, 
, 1 1.
GP
t tDC    
Therefore, (12) holds and the PPMI may be interpreted as the ratio of aggregated measures of 
productivity changes in the two groups separately. However, (13) cannot be applied because we 
are working with a pseudo-panel database instead of a standard panel database. 
 
3. Educational production function, dataset and variables 
 
In our empirical analysis, we use data from three PISA waves: 2006, 2009 and 2012. PISA is an 
initiative that the OECD started up in the late 1990s to assess 15-year-old students. The 
assessment focuses on measuring the extent to which students are able to apply their knowledge 
and skills to achieve future real-life challenges rather than evaluating how well they have 
mastered a specific school curriculum. Because home, school, and regional environments can 
play an important role in how students learn, PISA also collects general information about such 
background factors. 
 
In order to illustrate the potential of the approach proposed here, we provide an application to 
the Basque Country. The Basque Country is an Autonomous Region of Spain that has been 














sector and its management since 1980
7
. This region has opted to participate with an extended 
representative sample of its population for PISA assessment since 2003. Publicly funded 
schools in the Basque Country and Spain, i.e., schools receiving their core funding from 
government agencies, may be classified as either PS or PGDS. The difference lies in whether a 
public entity or a private agency, respectively, has decision-making authority concerning their 
management. PS are monitored and managed by a public education authority or agency. PGDS 
are governed by a non-public organization
8
, which implies that their governing board is not 
elected by a government agency. Private schools are classified as PGDS if they receive more 
than 50% of their core funding from government agencies
9
. It is important to note here that the 
academic program; the time allocated to each subject, as well as the academic degree required to 
qualify as a teacher is regulated by law and is exactly the same for both school types.  
 
3.1. Educational production function 
 
In many earlier papers on the economics of education, the common conceptual framework for 
estimating the educational production function at school level has taken the following form 
(Levin, 1974; Hanushek, 1979; Hanushek et al. 2013): 
 
 ),(
ttt SBfA   (8) 
Where tA  is the single output that now equals the average achievement of students attending the 
evaluated school at time t; tB is the school‘s average socio-economic background and tS are 
average school resources. Both tB and tS are the input components of tx in Equation 1, 
),( ttt SBx  . We can generalize the production function for the case where a school 





using the transformation function 
),( ttt yxH assuming that there are inefficient behaviors in schools (Nechyba, 2000; 
Woessman, 2001; Perelmand and Santín, 2011; Grosskopft et al. 2014; Johnes, 2014). In this 
way, we can calculate all the Malmquist index components.  
 
                                                 
7
 The Basque Country was the first Autonomous Region (or Community) inside Spain upon which 
educational policy powers were devolved by the central government after the Spanish transition to 
democracy in 1977.  
8
 Most of these organizations are Catholic schools, teachers‘ cooperatives, non-profit organizations or 
simply private enterprises.  
9
 There are also government-independent private schools, controlled by private organizations which 
















3.2. Outputs and inputs 
 
One of the main advantages of the PISA study is that each student receives a score in each test 
on a continuous scale. Likewise, PISA also collects a large set of data about the educational 
context from two questionnaires: one completed by the students themselves and another filled 
out by the principals. From these data, it is possible to extract information referred to the main 
determining factors of educational performance represented by variables associated with the 
family and the educational environments, as well as with the school management and the 
educational supply. 
 
The school output includes student knowledge and skills in different dimensions measured by 
the results that they achieve in the three vehicular competences evaluated in PISA (mathematics, 
reading and science). Fair comparisons of the two groups of schools over time inside a country 
or region with a representative sample are possible because PISA uses a common scale for the 
purpose of trends. However, results in different PISA waves are only directly comparable for 
some years and subjects (OECD, 2014a, p. 52-53). It is important to remark here under what 
circumstances PISA results in different waves are comparable. As OECD (2014b, p. 159) states 
―for PISA 2012 the decision was made to report the reading, mathematics and science scores on 
these previously developed scales. That is the reading scales used for PISA 2000, PISA 2003. 
PISA 2006, PISA 2009 and PISA 2012 are directly comparable. PISA 2012 mathematics 
reporting scale is directly comparable to PISA 2003, PISA 2006 and PISA 2009 and the science 
reporting scale is directly comparable to PISA 2006 and PISA 2009 scale‖. As a consequence, 
in this work we have not included PISA 2003 data because science results are only comparable 
from 2006 on, and this only includes PISA 2006, 2009 and 2012.  
 
In order to calculate the output-oriented CDMI and the PPMI we use four inputs directly 
involved in the learning process. We consider that schools have to operate with and try to 
achieve the best outputs from the resources that they have been allocated (including staff, school 
resources and also student background
10
). Therefore, the output-oriented CDMI and PPMI are 
the correct specifications for characterizing this production process and are selected to interpret 
performance gaps between both school types.  
- PARED is the index of the highest level of parental education, measured by the number of 
years of schooling according to the International Standard Classification of Education 
(ISCED; OECD, 1999). 
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- HISEI is the index of the highest parental occupational status according to International 
Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status (ISEI; Ganzeboom et al., 1992). 
- SCHRESOURCES is an index of the quality of the school resources derived from school 
principal responses. All questionnaires contain several items related to school deficiencies 
regarding such issues, but some items are different across the four waves. So ten coincident 
items were selected for each sample, and the school receives one point for each item for 
which the principal‘s response is not deficient
11
. The maximum (minimum) score for each 
school is ten (zero) points, which indicates an excellent (poor) educational input
12
.  
- STRATIO is a ratio between the total number of teachers weighted by their dedication (part-
time teachers contribute 0.5 and full-time teachers 1) and the total number of pupils and the 
total number of students. 
 
Tables 1 shows the mean values for the three outputs —student results in mathematics, reading 
and science— and the four inputs named above. The figures below indicate that student results 
were generally higher for students attending PGDS in all disciplines from 2006 to 2009. 
However, we observe a change in this trend in the last PISA 2012 wave, where it is slightly 
higher in PS. A similar trend applies to the average socioeconomic background, measured by 
the variables PARED and HISEI. These variables used to be lower in PS, but socioeconomic 
background is very similar in both school types in the last wave.  
 
With respect to school resources, we observe that there are no significant differences in the 
SCHRESOURCES variable over the years. Nevertheless, the teacher-student ratio (STRATIO) is 
favorable to students attending PS, where the ratio is higher. This implies that each teacher is in 
charge of a smaller group of students. This advantage of PS can be explained by the fact that 
PGDS tend to minimize the number of teachers that the school hires and conform strictly to the 
requirements of educational law as a way to cut costs. Also, the number of teachers in PGDS is 
relatively lower because they are assigned to teach general knowledge areas (sciences, arts, 
sports, etc.), whereas most teachers in PS are public servants and their teaching profile is more 
specialized.   
 
 
                                                 
11
 The selected items are: ‗Qualified science teachers‘, ‗Qualified mathematics teachers‘, ‗Qualified 
reading teachers‘, ‗Any other personal support‘, ‗Science laboratory equipment‘, ‗Educational material‘, 
‗Computers‘, ‗Software‘, ‗Library resources‘, ‗Audiovisual resources‘. This variable is subjective and for 
this reason is only a proxy of a more realistic ‗physical school resources‘ variable.  
12
















Table 1: Descriptive statistics of outputs and inputs in the Basque Country over three PISA 
waves. 
 
Public Schools (PS) 
 
2006 2009 2012 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
OUTPUTS       
Math 477.99 53.47 497.61 40.53 507.13 34.92 
Read 464.82 54.95 480.02 34.07 502.60 39.77 
Science 474.26 44.51 481.58 28.73 506.78 32.65 
INPUTS       
Pared 11.86 1.71 12.96 1.30 52.25 9.62 
Hisei 44.47 6.78 45.55 6.06 13.76 1.16 
Schresources   8.48 2.51   9.01 1.55 9.22 1.87 
Stratio 15.54 2.89 15.02 2.99 14.17 3.37 
Obsv. 56 68 72 
 
Private Government-Dependent Schools (PGDS) 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
OUTPUTS       
Math 512.45 38.62 520.73 34.77 499.91 48.75 
Read 500.62 39.03 509.52 36.64 491.41 50.41 
Science 505.40 36.91 507.56 35.15 502.73 47.63 
INPUTS       
Pared 12.89 1.57 13.80 1.37 13.48 10.57 
Hisei 49.33 8.42 51.53 8.07 49.13 1.54 
Schresources   8.06 2.73   9.08 1.85   9.72 1.63 
Stratio   6.89 1.25   7.41 1.72   7.17 1.68 
Obsv. 81 90 83 




This section reports the main results of our analysis for the Basque Country. Using the 
methodology described in Section 2, we can compare PGDS and PS relative performances over 
time from 2006 to 2012. 
 
Table 2 reports the results after applying the CDMI approach on school data for 2006, 2009 and 















tCDMI  for each year t and is calculated according to Equation 3. Results show relevant 
relative performance gaps, ranging from 36.95% (2006) to 25.66% (2012), every year, 
according to which PGDS have an edge over PS. The technological gap component
GP
tTG , 
calculated through Equation 4, clearly accounts for this gap in every wave, so the circumstances 
shown by the empirical analysis reveal that it is very similar to the situation illustrated in Figure 
1. PGDS presents the most productive frontiers, leading to a persistent productivity difference 
with respect to their public counterparts ( 1
GP
tTG  ). Finally, the technical efficiency spread gap 
GP
tEG  appears to play a minor role in explaining the relative performance gap since, in Table 2, 
GP
tEG  is close to 1 for each year except for 2006 where 0.9677
GP
tEG  . 
 









2006 1.3695 0.9677 1.4152 
2009 1.2265 0.9906 1.2341 
2012 1.2566 1.0078 1.2469 
A value greater than one indicates better performance in PGDS  





tCDMI and its components, Table 3 reports the time evolution of the relative 
performance gap (
GP
ttPPMI 1,  ) and its components, the efficiency spread gap change (
GP
ttEGC 1,  ) 
and the productivity frontier gap change (
GP
ttTGC 1,  ). 
 
 
Table 3: Pseudo-panel Malmquist index (PPMI). Productivity gains in PS and PGDS from 




ttPPMI 1,   
GP
ttEGC 1,   
GP
ttTGC 1,   
2006; 2009 0.8956 1.0237 0.8720 
2009; 2012 1.0246 1.0174 1.0104 
A value greater (less) than one indicates that the relative performance, 
efficiency spread or technological gaps open for PGDS (PS) with respect to PS (PGDS). 
 
Although PGDS had a better relative performance than PS, Table 3 shows that, on average, PS 
was catching up on the PGDS schools from 2006 to 2009 (by 10.44%), while relative 














cases, the relative gap change can be explained by the technological component, which presents 
the same behavior over time. The productivity frontier gap improved in favor of PS by 12.8% 
with respect to PGDS from 2006 to 2009, whereas it worsened by 1.04% from 2009 to 2012. In 
the case of the efficiency dimension, PS were able to narrow the gap with respect to PGDS by 
around 2.37% from 2006 to 2009, while the status of PGDS improved from period 2009 to 2012 
by 1.74%. 
 
Regarding the divergence component, it equals 0.9138 for the first biannual period and 0.9304 
for the second one. It means that the PPMI does not coincide with the ratio of productivity 
changes in group PGDS and PS. Indeed, the PPMI is smaller than the ratio of productivity 
changes by 8.62% from 2006 to 2009 and by 6.96% from 2009 to 2012.  
 
To summarize, the results show a persistent relative performance difference in favor of PGDS 
across all three waves. This means, according to an output orientation interpretation, that, with 
the same resources, student backgrounds and school inputs, the best PGDS are producing more 
than PS. We suggest two possible explanations for these results.  
 
First, according to the descriptive statistics in Table 1, having more pupils per full-time 
equivalent teachers in PGDS does not generally appear to deteriorate the learning process. This 
result is consistent with Hanushek‘s (1986, 1997, 2003) previous findings that pouring more 
educational resources into schools may not automatically translate into better academic results.  
 
Second, it is unclear which other factors account for these relative performance differences, but 
their existence warrants more research to monitor and correct this gap in the near future. 
Remember, however, that the theoretical literature referenced in Section 1 points out that private 
institution and teachers employed in the private sector have more incentives to make efficient 
use of resources and tend to be more productive. Some people prefer the PS option because they 
believe that teacher quality is higher as PS teachers need to pass a competitive state exam to 
enter the public school system. This is considered to possibly lead to better overall academic 
achievement. But teachers in PS are automatically granted tenure once they pass the entrance 
exam. This leads some people to argue that PS teachers do not have definite incentives to 
improve their teaching methods and activities once they have joined the system as civil servants 
(basically, because they cannot be dismissed). This could affect PS performance, rendering a 
more flexible private management preferable. Although more research is needed, it looks as if 



















The Malmquist index methodology is widely used in the literature in order to measure the 
productivity growth within two time periods as the distance between each DMU and the frontier 
for each period. However, the traditional Malmquist index cannot be implemented without a 
panel database, so it focuses on analyzing the evolution of the same units over time. 
 
In this paper, we extend the Malmquist-type index proposed by Camanho and Dyson (2006) that 
is used to measure the average relative performance divergences between different groups of 
DMUs within the same year. Thus, a pseudo-panel Malmquist index is built for comparing the 
evolution of average performance discrepancies between publicly funded schools, including 
both public and private government-dependent schools, when only a pseudo-panel database is 
available.  
 
To illustrate this approach, we use data on publicly funded schools (PGDS and PS) in the 
educational context of the Spanish Basque Country region from the PISA 2006, 2009 and 2012 
databases that provide us with a wide range of information. Results indicate that PGDS 
persistently obtain better relative performance than PS over time. PGDS outperform PS due to 
PGDS’s technological superiority. This means that the within-group technical efficiency 
variance is on average similar at both school types, and there will be good and bad schools 
within each group. However, the best schools that define the most productive frontier belong to 
the PGDS group. Also, the evolution of the technological gap from 2006 to 2012 is flat, so the 
initial differences in favor of PGDS are still there at the end of the analyzed six-year period. 
From a policy-making viewpoint, this result suggests that more attention and resources should 
be spent on improving teaching practices inside classrooms and on monitoring the educational 
system in order to close the performance gap between all schools funded with public resources. 
 
Finally, in their empirical application Camanho and Dyson (2006) ran the CDMI with different, 
but similar, group sizes. As they recognize, there may be an unaccounted-for group size effect 
when group sizes are severely unbalanced, although it is expected to be insignificant when both 
groups have similar sizes. For this reason we suggest, as a future line of research, to develop a 
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